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At the planning stage of a roadway construction or preservation project, public agencies 
face a crucial challenge; to adopt and implement the appropriate contractual framework 
that can minimize the anticipated project discrepancies, on the basis of project-specific 
conditions. Focusing on public–private partnerships (PPPs), a deeper understanding of 
the factors that affect each type of discrepancy can assist public agencies in thoroughly 
evaluating and comparing PPP options. This paper seeks to provide an empirical but 
comprehensive analysis on PPP-specific project discrepancies, by identifying influential 
factors that significantly affect cost savings, cost overrun, change orders, and time 
delays in roadway projects. Using data from 645 PPP projects implemented in the USA 
between 1996 and 2011, seven popular PPP contracting approaches in the USA were 
considered in the analysis, and a number of random parameters linear and non-linear 
statistical models were estimated by PPP approach. The results demonstrate that 
PPP-specific attributes such as project cost, size, types of constituent activities, and 
expected duration have mixed effects on the occurrence and the magnitude of each 
type of discrepancy.
Keywords: public–private partnerships, project discrepancies, cost savings, cost overrun, change orders, time 
delays, random parameters, statistical modeling
inTrODUcTiOn
Over the last decades, public agencies have been facing challenges in constraining expenditure for 
new transportation infrastructure projects or for the preservation of the aging infrastructure. This 
has led to innovative and cost-efficient technological advancements, which has in turn motivated 
the development of alternative funding methods that combine the public sector’s experience with 
the private entities’ capital investment and risk undertaking. Public–private partnerships (PPPs) for 
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roadway construction and preservation constitute a rapidly grow-
ing type of synergy (contractual agreement) formed between 
public agencies and private sector entities (Engel et al., 2011). In 
fact, more than 46 billion dollars were disbursed between 1990 
and 2010 in the USA for transportation PPP projects (Rall et al., 
2010), while over 150 billion euros were allocated to PPP trans-
portation projects in the European Union between 2000 and 2015 
(Tomasi, 2016). Despite the widespread use of PPPs, the majority 
of public agencies have yet to determine a comprehensive deci-
sion making framework with respect to appropriate PPP type 
selection for a given transportation project. The need for such 
framework is corroborated by the frequent presence of critical 
project cost and time discrepancies during the implementation 
phase of PPP contracts.
Project cost and time discrepancies constitute contractual 
aberrations of high interest to both public and the private entities, 
and typically include cost overrun, cost savings, change orders, 
and time delays (Bordat et al., 2004). Previous research has been 
devoted on the investigation of the influential factors for each of 
the aforementioned project discrepancies, independently of the 
PPP type. The goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive 
comparison of the parameters affecting contract discrepancies of 
popular PPP types, such as cost-plus-time (A + B),1 performance-
based contracting (PBC),2 incentives/disincentives (I/D),3 
design–build–operate–maintain (DBOM),4 lane rentals,5 and 
warranties6 (Mallet, 2008; Anastasopoulos et al., 2010a; Papajohn 
et al., 2010).
The identification of discrepancy- and PPP-specific rela-
tionships (i.e., identification of parameters specific to each 
discrepancy and PPP type) aims to assist transportation agencies 
in deciding whether a particular PPP type is appropriate for a 
specific roadway construction or preservation project, in terms 
of minimizing discrepancies and maximizing benefits.
1 Under the cost-plus-time contracting method, Agencies employ the initial con-
struction/maintenance cost and the total project duration, as fundamental criteria 
for awarding the project to the contractor (Choi et al., 2013; Anastasopoulos et al., 
2014).
2 Performance-based contracting (PBC) constitutes a more flexible method for 
contractors, since only the required—in the final stage—physical conditions of 
the project are specified in the contracting agreement; thus, the evaluation of the 
final project deliverables, in terms of several pre-agreed performance standards, 
constitutes the basic criterion for the payment of the contractor (Anastasopoulos 
et al., 2014).
3 Incentives/Disincentives (I/D) provide monetary awards to contractors for early 
project completion, and discourage delays or unsubstantiated extensions through 
imposing penalties.
4 In the design-build-operate-maintain approach, the contractor undertakes the 
processes of designing, constructing, operating and preserving the roadway (over a 
pre-specified period of time), with the public entity holding the ultimate ownership 
of the infrastructure (Abdel-Aziz, 2007).
5 Over the last years, lane rentals are primarily preferred for projects with ongoing 
operation of the roadway, throughout the entire project duration. Specifically, the 
contractor is charged with an additional cost in order to “rent” existing lanes or 
shoulders, in an effort to reduce the total project duration (Anastasopoulos et al., 
2014).
6 Warranties introduce contractor’ responsibilities for possible deficiencies or 
inconsistencies with the pre-determined performance standards of the project; 
therefore, the contractor is strongly encouraged to deliver a high-quality infra-
structure, in order to minimize the anticipated maintenance or rehabilitation cost, 
during the warranty period (Singh et al., 2007).
reVieW OF PasT WOrK
A significant amount of past research in PPP projects for 
roadway construction and preservation has focused on the 
identification of factors affecting cost savings, cost overrun, 
time delays, and change orders (Rowland, 1981; Hester et  al., 
1991; Majid and McCaffer, 1998; Jacoby, 2001; Ellis and Thomas, 
2003; Fimpong et al., 2003; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Bordat et al., 
2004; Odeck, 2004; Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006; Gkritza and Labi, 
2008; Anastasopoulos et al., 2010a,b,c, 2011, 2014; Serag et al., 
2010; Ambituuni, 2011; Irfan et al., 2011; Cantarelli et al., 2012). 
For example, Odeck (2004) formulated a regression framework 
to investigate the factors affecting cost overrun in roadway 
construction projects and found that small-scale projects are 
more vulnerable to cost overrun. The effect of the project size 
along with other significant contract attributes on cost savings 
and cost overrun was also investigated by Anastasopoulos et al. 
(2010b, 2011, 2014), using data for different activity types and 
multiple PPP types. These studies identified the project duration 
as a major influential factor for the cost overrun or cost savings. 
Cost overrun was also examined with respect to the successive 
phases of the project development, with the stage between the 
decision for the project implementation and the beginning 
of the construction works being critical for the cost overrun 
(Cantarelli et al., 2012).
Time delay is another factor that results in project discrepan-
cies, especially in long-term transportation projects. For example, 
Bordat et  al. (2004) found that approximately 12% of the con-
tracts let by the Indiana Department of Transportation between 
1996 and 2001, had an approximate delay of 115 days. Majid and 
McCaffer (1998) considered several groups of factors related to 
project planning and development (e.g., labor, equipment, mate-
rial, control, etc.) and identified and ranked 25 main causes that 
can result in non-excusable delays. A number of studies (Ellis and 
Thomas, 2003; Fimpong et  al., 2003; Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006; 
Ambituuni, 2011; Irfan et al., 2011) identified several factors as 
significant causes of time delays in highway construction projects, 
such as design errors, impact of weather, unpredicted site condi-
tions, modifications in the design and the scope of the project, 
inefficient planning and scheduling procedures, poor technical 
performance, and deadline contract type, to name a few.
Finally, change orders in transportation projects pertain 
to modifications in the project’s scope, in terms of additional 
requirements, amount, time, and design method alterations. 
Several linear regression, discrete outcome, and count data mod-
eling techniques have been used to identify possible influential 
factors that can affect change orders, such as the construction 
complexity of the project, site conditions, the project’s final cost, 
the difference between the initial cost estimation (by the agency) 
and the winning bid amount, design deficiencies, and weather 
conditions (Rowland, 1981; Hester et  al., 1991; Jacoby, 2001; 
Anastasopoulos et al., 2010c; Serag et al., 2010).
MeThOD anD aPPrOach
Two approaches are considered for the investigation of project 
discrepancies for roadway construction and preservation by 
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PPP type. To explore the factors that affect the extent of project 
discrepancies for each PPP type, linear regression models are 
estimated for the percentage of cost savings and cost overrun, 
count data (Poisson) models are estimated for the change orders 
frequency, and hazard-based duration models are estimated for 
the time delay. At the pre-planning phase, many transportation 
agencies are as well interested in identifying factors affecting the 
likelihood that a project will incur project discrepancies (Gkritza 
and Labi, 2008; Anastasopoulos et al., 2010a, 2014). To that end, 
the likelihood of cost savings, cost overrun, change orders, and 
time delay occurrence is investigated, through the use of binary 
logit and probit models. Next, an overview of the methodological 
approaches is presented.
The percentage of cost savings, %CSki, and cost overrun, %COki, 
for a project i performed under contract type k, are, respectively, 
calculated as follows:
 % [( )/ ],CS CB CA CBki ki ki ki= × −100  (1)
and
 % [( )/ ],CO C C Cki Fki WBki WBki= × −100  (2)
where CBki is the final contract cost performed under traditional 
contracting (which is typically based on the amount of work 
being measured and paid for on agreed rates for various work 
items), CAki is the final contract cost of the project (including the 
same work items and project characteristics) performed under 
the PPP approach, CWBki is the winning bid cost of the project, 
and CFki is the final project cost upon its completion and delivery 
to the agency. For the two dependent variables, %CSki and %COki, 
the linear regression model can be specified as:
 % ,CSki CSki CS CSki CSki= + +β β X ε  (3)
and
 % ,COki COki CO COki COki= + +β β X ε  (4)
where βCSki and βCOki are constant terms, βCO and βCS are vectors 
of estimable parameters, XCSki and XCOki are vectors of explana-
tory parameters, εCSki and εCOki, are the disturbance terms, and all 
other terms as previously defined. With regard to the estimation 
of the vectors of parameters, the most common approach for the 
regression context is the ordinary least squares estimation (for 
an example, see Anastasopoulos et al., 2015). However, in order 
to account for unobserved heterogeneity across the observations, 
random parameters are introduced in model estimation, thus 
the maximum likelihood estimation method is adopted herein. 
Specifically, the log-likelihood functions, for the two dependent 
variables, are specified as (Washington et al., 2011):
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where I is the number of observations, σ2 is the variance of the 
normally distributed error terms, and all other terms are as 
previously defined. The maximization of the log-likelihood func-
tion yields the best specified parameter estimates of the linear 
regression model.
Given that a project time delay has occurred, the length of the 
delay can be statistically modeled as duration data using hazard-
based duration modeling methods. To model the conditional 
probability of a project delay terminating at time t (under the 
condition that it has not terminated until then), a hazard function 
that accounts for the effect of explanatory variables is specified as 
(Washington et al., 2011):
 h t | = h tX X( ) ( ) −( )0 exp β , (7)
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard (denoting the hazard when all 
elements of the explanatory variables vector are zero), and all 
other terms as previously defined. The underlying hazard function 
in Eq. 5 can take various parametric forms, such as Exponential, 
Weibull, and Log-logistic (Anastasopoulos et  al., 2012, 2017). 
For model estimation, all three parametric forms were explored, 
and the Weibull model provided the best statistical fit (in terms 
of goodness-of-fit measures, such as log-likelihood function at 
convergence, McFadden pseudo-R2, and Akaike Information 
criteria). For the Weibull model, with parameters λ > 0 and P > 0, 
the density function is (Washington et al., 2011):
 f t P t tP P( ) ( ) exp ( )= − 
−λ λ λ1  (8)
and the baseline hazard in Eq. 5 becomes:
 h t P t P( ) = ( ) −λ λ 1 . (9)
The Weibull model yields monotonically increasing or 
decreasing (over time) hazard functions, on the basis of the esti-
mable Weibull parameter P. If P is greater than one, the hazard 
monotonically increases with the delay duration, indicating that 
the probability of a project delay terminating at time t increases 
over time; the opposite is observed, if P is less than one, since the 
hazard function monotonically decreases with the delay duration, 
indicating that the probability of a project delay terminating at 
time t decreases over time. For the estimation of the vector of 
parameters β, a maximum likelihood estimation method is 
adopted.
The frequency of change orders can be modeled using 
count data modeling approaches, such as the Poisson and 
negative binomial models, and their zero-inflated counterparts 
(Anastasopoulos et al., 2010c). For model estimation, all count 
data modeling techniques were explored, and the Poisson model 
gave the best overall statistical fit (in terms of goodness-of-fit 
measures, such as log-likelihood function at convergence, ρ2, 
Vuong statistic, and Akaike Information criteria). For the Poisson 
model, the probability, P(ni), of contract, i, to incur n change 
orders is (Washington et al., 2011):
 P n =
n!i
i i
n
i
i
( ) −( )exp λ λ , (10)
where λi =  exp(βXi) is the expected number of change orders, 
and all other terms as previously defined. For model estimation, a 
maximum likelihood estimation method was employed, with the 
corresponding log-likelihood function being defined as:
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where yi is the frequency of change orders with expected value 
E(yi) = λi, and all other terms as previously defined. Since there 
is not dispersion in the data, the maximum likelihood estimates 
of the Poisson model yield unbiased and consistent parameters.
For the likelihood of cost savings, cost overrun, change orders, 
and time delay occurrence, binary (since only two outcomes 
are considered: discrepancy and non-discrepancy occurrence) 
logit and probit models can be used (Washington et al., 2011). 
The fundamental difference between the two logit and probit 
approaches arises from the assumed distribution of the error 
terms. For the logit specification, the disturbances are assumed 
to be Gumbel-extreme value Type I distributed, whereas, for the 
probit specification, the disturbances are assumed to be normally 
distributed. The binary logit outcome probabilities are thus 
defined as (Washington et al., 2011):
 P D =ki
D Dki
( )
+ −( ) 
1
1 exp
,
β X  (12)
and the binary probit outcome probabilities as:
 P D = D D ND NDki kiki ( )
−




Φ
β βX X
σ
, (13)
where Pki(D) is the probability of observation, i, in PPP approach, 
k, incurring a discrepancy, D, or no discrepancy, ND, in terms of 
cost savings, cost overrun, time delay, or change orders, Φ(.) is 
the standardized cumulative normal distribution, and σ is a scal-
ing parameter (which is typically set to one) that determines the 
discrete outcomes. For the estimation of the parameter vectors βD 
and βND, standard maximum likelihood estimation methods are 
used (Washington et al., 2011). Specifically, for the probit model 
specification, the log-likelihood function is:
 LL LN J
i
I
= − ∀
=
∑ β βD D JD JDki iX XΣ exp( ) ;
1
 (14)
whereas, for the logit model specification, the log-likelihood 
function is defined as:
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where δDi is equal to 1 if the observation i incurs a discrepancy, 
D, or zero otherwise, N denotes the number of observations, and 
the other terms are as previously defined.
To account for unobserved heterogeneity—a common 
misspecification issue—the effect of the parameters of the 
aforementioned modeling schemes is allowed to vary across the 
observations, through the use of random parameters modeling. 
This is an important consideration, as if unobserved heteroge-
neity is not addressed, the parameter estimates can be errone-
ous, the inferences inconsistent, and the forecasts inaccurate 
(Washington et  al., 2011; Russo et  al., 2014; Anastasopoulos, 
2016; Anastasopoulos and Mannering, 2016; Mannering et  al., 
2016; Sarwar et al., 2016, 2017). In random parameters modeling, 
the coefficients become:
 β β ωn n= + , (16)
where βn is a vector of estimable parameters, and ωn is a randomly 
distributed term (for example, a normally distributed term with 
mean zero and variance σ2). Under this consideration, βn is a vec-
tor of individual parameters across observations, with its variation 
to be described by a density function—also referred as mixing 
distribution—q(β|ω), where ω refers to a vector of parameters of 
the density distribution (Greene, 2007; Washington et al., 2011; 
Anastasopoulos et  al., 2012). To address the added complexity 
by the inclusion of random parameters in the computation of 
outcome probabilities, a simulation-based maximum likelihood 
estimation approach is employed. Specifically, various values of 
βs are drawn from the density function q(β|ω) and are used for 
the computation of the logit (or probit) outcome probabilities, as 
shown in Eqs 12 and 13. Numerous iterations of the same pro-
cedure provide the corresponding simulated probabilities, which 
are, in turn, introduced in the simulated log-likelihood function 
(Washington et al., 2011). As far as the sampling technique of β 
values from the mixing distribution is concerned, the technique 
of Halton draws (Halton, 1960) is employed, which can provide 
efficient probability approximations, by limiting the number of 
draws to the smallest possible extent; the non-random selection 
of draws provide more robust estimates, as compared to the use 
of purely random draws (see Bhat, 2003; Train, 2003; Washington 
et al., 2011, for further details on the simulation approach). For 
model estimation, 200 Halton draws are used, which have been 
shown to yield stable and accurate parameter estimates (Bhat, 
2003; Milton et  al., 2008; Anastasopoulos et  al., 2016). For the 
functional form of the parameter density function, normal, 
Weibull, lognormal, uniform, and triangular distributions were 
considered in model estimation, and the normal distribution 
yielded the best specified model results, in terms of statistical fit. 
It should be noted that a parameter is considered as random when 
the mean and the SD of the parameter density function are sta-
tistically different from zero, at a pre-specified level of confidence 
(at a 0.90 level of confidence herein).
eMPirical seTTing
To identify the factors that affect the extent and likelihood 
of project discrepancies, cost- and project-specific data are 
used. These data have been published in previous studies 
(Anastasopoulos et al., 2010a, 2011; Nahidi, 2015; Nahidi et al., 
2015; Sarwar and Anastasopoulos, 2016a,b) and have since been 
extended to include new information, in terms of the number 
of contracts and of the independent variables (i.e., pavement, 
traffic safety, and operations characteristics). Specifically, the 
data include information for 645 PPP contracts implemented 
in the USA between 1996 and 2011. In addition to traditional 
outsourcing contracts, six popular PPP types are represented 
in the data, namely, cost-plus-time (A + B), PBC, I/D, DBOM, 
lane rentals, and warranties. These data also include cost and 
time-related information (contract cost, bid cost, number of 
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bids, cost savings, cost overrun/underrun, time delay, number 
of change orders and associated costs, etc.); contract duration 
(and extension); roadway functional classification and roadway 
geometrics (segment length, number of lanes, median and 
shoulder attributes, drainage rating, and horizontal/vertical 
alignment characteristics); pavement characteristics (roughness, 
rutting depth, and pavement condition rating); traffic charac-
teristics (annual average daily traffic, level of service, and truck 
traffic); weather conditions (precipitation and temperature); 
and number of assets (constructed or preserved) included in the 
contract. In addition, these data contain information about the 
scope and activity type of the project (e.g., construction, repair, 
maintenance, and management activities), as well as the asset 
type (e.g., pavements, bridges, roadway cross-section elements, 
traffic infrastructure, landscape, and emergency facilities). 
Table  1 presents descriptive statistics of key variables. For a 
detailed description of the dataset, see Nahidi (2015) and Nahidi 
et al. (2015).
MODel esTiMaTiOn resUlTs
Tables  2–9 present the estimation results of the best model 
specifications (several variables and variable combinations were 
explored, and the ones that provided the best overall statistical 
fit—in terms of goodness-of-fit measures—are presented herein), 
along with their goodness-of-fit measures, for the extent and 
likelihood of project discrepancies by PPP type. The subsequent 
sections provide a brief discussion of the model estimation results 
for each discrepancy type. Note that, for brevity, key results 
(including only a few random parameters) are discussed in detail.
cost savings
Tables  2 and 3 presents the model estimation results of the 
random parameters linear regression and binary logit models, 
for the percentage and likelihood of cost savings, respectively. 
The results show that project size (in terms of outsourced lane-
miles) has mixed effects on cost savings. For example, large size 
projects decrease the percentage of cost savings for DBOM, 
I/D, and warranties; while, they decrease the percentage of cost 
savings for 72% of A + B contracts (for 28% of these contracts, 
they increase the cost savings), and for 68% of PBCs (for 32% 
they increase the cost savings for PBCs). Contract duration is 
also found to be an influential factor. Contracts with duration 
of more than 2 years decrease cost savings for warranties, tradi-
tional, DBOM, and A + B contracts. Cost savings percentage is 
as well affected by the number of outsourced assets, with three 
or more outsourced assets generally reducing cost savings. The 
findings are in line with the literature (Anastasopoulos et al., 
2010b,d, 2014).
Furthermore, the results show that high cost contracts (with 
a total final cost exceeding $11.5M) increase cost savings for 
DBOM, while low-cost contracts (with a total final cost of $600K 
or less) increase cost savings for lane rentals. The activity type also 
plays a significant role in cost savings. For example, pavement 
related activities (such as pavement repair, maintenance, and 
treatment) increase the percentage of cost savings under DBOM 
contracts; while cross-section specific activities (such as culvert, 
ditches, gutters, or drainage repair, maintenance, or replacement; 
or mowing, vegetation, or tree control maintenance or removal) 
increase cost savings for lane rentals and PBCs. On the contrary, 
activities such as culvert, ditches, gutters or drainage repair, 
maintenance or replacement, and guardrail repair, reduce cost 
savings for I/Ds, while mowing and litter removal reduce cost 
savings for warranties. These findings are in line with previous 
studies (Anastasopoulos et al., 2010d, 2014).
Turning to the results of the random parameters (mixed) 
binary logit models, the likelihood of cost savings occurrence is 
affected by a number of location-specific factors. For example, 
warranties and DBOM contracts in Virginia and Minnesota, 
respectively, are more likely to incur loss; while, DBOM contracts 
in Indiana are more likely to incur cost savings. Interestingly, the 
likelihood of cost savings occurrence for DBOM, I/D, and war-
ranties decreases, when the contract duration increases; whereas 
the opposite effect is observed for lane rentals.
Moreover, project size (in terms of lane-miles) is found to sig-
nificantly affect the likelihood of cost savings occurrence. Large 
size DBOM, PBC, and traditional projects are more likely to incur 
cost savings; while, short size (less than 30 lane-miles) warranty 
projects are more likely to incur cost savings. The contract cost 
is found to have mixed effects on the likelihood of cost savings 
occurrence. For example, PBC contracts exceeding $110M in 
final cost are less likely to incur cost savings, whereas, high cost 
warranties (greater than $70M) and medium- to low-cost DBOM 
($4M or less) are more likely to incur cost savings. The results also 
show that PBC and DBOM contracts with only one outsourced 
activity are more likely to incur cost savings. This finding likely 
captures the effect of smaller projects, which are typically less 
prone to cost and time discrepancies.
With respect to the specific activity types included in the 
contract, mowing is found to reduce the likelihood of cost sav-
ings occurrence in traditional contracts. This is an indication that 
mowing may favor outsourcing under a different PPP option, 
as, for example, PBC (Anastasopoulos et al., 2010d). Pavement 
maintenance or rehabilitation activities for A + B contracts are 
likely to reduce the likelihood of cost savings occurrence. At the 
same time, illumination repair and maintenance for warranty 
contracts has mixed effects on the likelihood of cost savings 
occurrence. These findings are in accordance with previous 
research (Anastasopoulos et al., 2010d, 2014).
cost Overrun
Tables  4 and 5 present the model estimation results of the 
random parameters linear regression and binary probit models, 
for the percentage and likelihood of cost overrun, respectively. 
As with the cost savings models, the results show that project 
size (in terms of outsourced lane-miles) has mixed effects on 
cost overrun. For instance, large size PBC projects reduce cost 
overrun; whereas, for 86 and 30% of A +  B and warranties, 
respectively, large size projects increase cost overrun (while, 
for the remaining 14 and 70% of A + B and warranties, respec-
tively, large size projects reduce cost overrun). The results also 
show that contract duration (measured in years) has mixed 
effects on I/D and PBC cost overrun. Long duration contracts 
(greater than 4 years) reduce PBC cost overrun for the majority 
Table 1 | Descriptive statistics of key variables (average values, with sDs in parentheses).
Variables all Usa  
contracts
a + b DbOM i/D lane  
rentals
Pbc Traditional Warranties
Contract duration (years) 4.528  
(2.203)
4.151  
(1.531)
5.667  
(0.852)
4.273  
(1.547)
2.614  
(0.529)
5.532  
(1.573)
3.478  
(2.500)
4.761  
(2.816)
Project size (lane-miles) 76.746  
(142.530)
33.948  
(40.335)
30.053  
(31.679)
57.004  
(58.848)
38.516  
(33.160)
258.808  
(270.234)
86.485  
(123.411)
24.549  
(80.171)
Number of assets 2.025  
(1.999)
2.581  
(2.335)
1.627  
(1.672)
1.73  
(1.387)
2.382  
(2.387)
1.544  
(1.526)
2.278  
(2.221)
2.402  
(2.144)
Contract cost (in $1M) 21.858  
(36.552)
9.587  
(9.669)
27.715  
(28.926)
19.332  
(20.994)
11.255  
(9.167)
60.103  
(63.314)
7.008  
(19.287)
19.419  
(37.930)
Cost savings (percentage) 0.031  
(0.118)
0.099  
(0.092)
0.000  
(0.0532)
0.146  
(0.083)
0.085  
(0.053)
0.069  
(0.084)
0.019  
(0.156)
−0.003  
(0.123)
Final cost of contract award (in $1M) 20.731  
(35.009)
10.766  
(13.316)
25.143  
(25.243)
19.465  
(19.171)
10.338  
(9.224)
63.307  
(65.834)
6.346  
(16.223)
15.041  
(27.684)
Cost overrun (in $100K) 11.273  
(97.093)
11.789  
(57.439)
25.727  
(76.208)
1.329  
(67.129)
9.171  
(21.529)
−32.047  
(157.454)
6.622  
(69.799)
43.782  
(129.601)
Cost overrun (percent) 0.154  
(0.362)
0.034  
(0.302)
0.126  
(0.223)
0.007  
(0.234)
0.126  
(0.178)
−0.031  
(0.159)
0.236  
(0.530)
0.291  
(0.243)
Time delay (percent) 0.274  
(0.330)
−0.195  
(0.285)
0.496  
(0.046)
−0.181  
(0.220)
0.256  
(0.087)
−0.183  
(0.294)
0.355  
(0.252)
0.427  
(0.180)
Number of change orders 4.04  
(2.641)
0.871  
(1.648)
3.888  
(2.272)
2.216  
(1.828)
3.706  
(2.023)
4.418  
(3.369)
4.242  
(2.41)
5.412  
(2.532)
Truck percentage 0.150  
(0.113)
0.157  
(0.117)
0.149  
(0.108)
0.169  
(0.143)
0.148  
(0.074)
0.136  
(0.096)
0.147  
(0.114)
0.162  
(0.126)
Mean of AADT (in 1,000s of vehicles/day) 12.909  
(16.778)
12.754  
(20.281)
12.581  
(16.066)
21.664  
(28.960)
7.497  
(5.254)
18.206  
(18.496)
12.181  
(15.564)
9.260  
(11.790)
Average of international roughness index 
(in inches)
108.633  
(41.278)
114.856  
(35.428)
114.859  
(45.852)
95.016  
(28.960)
103.363  
(35.607)
106.411  
(30.552)
106.860  
(39.148)
108.266  
(50.320)
SD of international roughness index  
(in inches)
25.716  
(23.331)
28.345  
(19.479)
28.052  
(35.559)
21.977  
(28.428)
25.636  
(17.336)
24.103  
(14.130)
24.379  
(16.238)
26.302  
(20.846)
Average of pavement condition rating  
(on a 0–100 scale)
88.293  
(4.598)
87.313  
(3.987)
87.653  
(4.270)
89.689  
(4.079)
88.412  
(4.743)
88.149  
(4.113)
88.609  
(4.449)
88.621  
(5.877)
SD of pavement condition rating  
(on a 0–100 scale)
7.652  
(3.039)
9.111  
(3.053)
7.707  
(3.078)
7.040  
(2.088)
8.0186  
(3.287)
8.068  
(2.918)
7.528  
(3.017)
7.11  
(2.947)
Average of rutting depth (in inches/mile) 0.160  
(0.073)
0.169  
(0.062)
0.172  
(0.076)
0.138  
(0.060)
0.154  
(0.062)
0.155  
(0.059)
0.154  
(0.068)
0.161  
(0.094)
SD of rutting depth (in inches/mile) 0.0565  
(0.046)
0.042  
(0.027)
0.059  
(0.041)
0.051  
(0.033)
0.051  
(0.029)
0.056  
(0.043)
0.059  
(0.054)
0.056  
(0.049)
Number of lanes 2.098  
(0.614)
2.161  
(0.374)
2.207  
(0.544)
1.919  
(0.547)
2.147  
(0.500)
2.228  
(0.451)
1.995  
(0.771)
2.041  
(0.557)
Median width (in feet) 23.76279  
(40.468)
20.452  
(26.867)
31.787  
(46.354)
13.892  
(23.310)
31.529  
(45.791)
24.228  
(41.761)
21.283  
(38.359)
16.567  
(34.626)
Interior shoulder width (in feet) 6.676  
(4.543)
6.839  
(3.975)
7.003  
(4.771)
5.986  
(4.481)
6.618  
(4.987)
6.101  
(4.282)
6.810  
(4.512)
6.532  
(4.494)
Outside shoulder width (in feet) 9.437  
(4.588)
9.300  
(5.068)
9.286  
(4.958)
9.308  
(4.470)
8.241  
(4.610)
9.222  
(4.332)
9.776  
(4.439)
9.695  
(4.334)
Number of observations 645 31 169 37 34 79 198 97
A + B, cost-plus-time; DBOM, design–build–operate–maintain; I/D, incentives/disincentives; PBC, performance-based contracting.
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(66%) of the contracts and increase it for the minority (34%) 
of the contracts, while, as the contract duration increases, I/D 
cost overrun decreases for 88% of the contracts and increases 
for the remaining 12%. Contract cost is also found to have 
mixed effects on cost overrun. As the PBC and A +  B final 
cost increases, cost overrun also increases in 72% of PBC and 
93% of A +  B contracts, and decreases for the remaining 28 
and 7% of these contracts, respectively. Whereas an increase 
in I/D final cost is found to constantly reduce cost overrun for 
all contracts.
Moving to the effect of the number of activities and activity 
types on cost overrun, A + B and traditional contracts with one 
or three activities, respectively, increase cost overrun for 88 and 
91% of the contracts, and reduce it for the remaining 12 and 9% of 
the contracts, respectively. In contrast, DBOM contracts with less 
than three activities increase the cost overrun, but the magnitude 
of the increase varies across the contracts. Crack/pothole sealing 
and repair, or emergency facilities maintenance and repair, are 
found to increase cost overrun for 77% of warranty contracts, and 
reduce it for the remaining 23%—possibly capturing location-
specific heterogeneity, whereas pavement repair, maintenance, or 
treatment reduce cost overrun of warranty contracts. This result 
is intuitive, considering the wide use of warranties for pavement 
work (Bordat et al., 2004). Another interesting finding pertains to 
bridge and tunnel repair, maintenance or management (activities 
that are both expensive and comprehensive), which are found to 
Table 2 | random parameters linear regression model estimation results for cost savings percentage (t-stats in parentheses).
Variables a + b DbOM i/D lane rental Pbc Traditional Warranty
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
Constant 0.433  
(3.06)
– 17.865 
(23.26)
13.095 
(29.47)
– – –
SD of parameter density function – – 5.813  
(9.58)
– – – –
contract characteristics
Project size (in 100s of lane-miles) – −2.550 
(−6.33)
– – – – –
SD of parameter density function – 1.020  
(5.16)
– – – – –
Inverse of the squared project size (in lane-miles) – – −0.007 
(−3.97)
– – – –
Natural logarithm of the squared project size (in lane-miles) – – – – – −0.313 
(−4.36)
Project size indicator (1 if less than 18 lane-miles, 0 otherwise) 0.478  
(2.70)
– – – – – –
SD of parameter density function 0.831  
(8.30)
– – – – – –
Project size indicator (1 if less than 120 lane-miles, 0 otherwise) – – – – 5.648  
(7.00)
– –
SD of parameter density function – – – – 12.286 
(15.77)
– –
Contract duration indicator (1 if between 5.2 and 6 years, 0 otherwise) 0.587  
(2.29)
– – – – – –
Contract duration indicator (1 if greater than 4 years, 0 otherwise) – −0.645 
(−1.87)
– – – – –
Contract duration indicator (1 if less than 2 years, 0 otherwise) – – – – – 7.246  
(5.26)
–
Contract duration indicator (1 if 0.5 years or less, 0 otherwise) – – – – 4.710  
(5.43)
– –
Contract duration indicator (1 if greater than 6 years, 0 otherwise) – – – – – – −25.296 
(−7.83)
SD of parameter density function – – – – – – 24.154  
(7.92)
Contract cost indicator (1 if greater than $11.5M, 0 otherwise) – 2.070  
(5.40)
– – – – –
Contract cost indicator (1 if $0.6M or less, 0 otherwise) – – – 4.316  
(3.75)
– – –
Number of assets indicator (1 if one asset is included in the contract, 0 otherwise) – – – – – 9.807  
(5.10)
–
Number of assets indicator (1 if two are included in the contract, 0 otherwise) 0.406  
(1.84)
– −8.035 
(−6.56)
– 4.203  
(6.54)
– –
SD of parameter density function – – – – 4.42  
(9.35)
– –
(Continued )
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Variables a + b DbOM i/D lane rental Pbc Traditional Warranty
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
Number of assets indicator (1 if three or less assets are included in the contract, 0 otherwise) – – – – – – 3.251  
(3.53)
SD of parameter density function – – – – – – 0.916  
(2.29)
asset type
Asset type indicator (1 if pavement repair/maintenance/treatment, 0 otherwise) – 29.229 
(2.41)
– – – – –
Asset type indicator (1 if culvert/ditches/gutters/drainage repair/maintenance/replacement, or guardrail repair/
maintenance, 0 otherwise)
– – – −6.163 
(−4.01)
7.013  
(5.31)
– –
SD of parameter density function – – – 11.973  
(9.83)
– – –
Asset type indicator (1 if electrical/cable system repair/maintenance, or rest areas, 0 otherwise) – – – – −16.361 
(−9.28)
– –
Asset type indicator (1 if landscape repair/maintenance, 0 otherwise) – – – – – – −9.654 
(−2.18)
Asset type indicator (1 if illumination repair/maintenance, 0 otherwise) – – – – – – −7.762 
(−2.17)
SD of parameter density function – – – – – – 6.134  
(2.01)
Asset type indicator (1 if litter removal, or mowing, 0 otherwise) – – – – – – 21.666  
(4.06)
SD of parameter density function – – – – – – 14.462  
(4.34)
Asset type indicator (1 if mowing, 0 otherwise) – – – – – −7.859 
(−2.88)
–
SD of parameter density function – – – – – 6.393  
(2.82)
–
roadway characteristics
Highway indicator (1 if highway, 0 otherwise) – – – – – −4.583 
(−2.26)
–
SD of parameter density function – – – – – 6.278  
(12.35)
–
Road type indicator (1 if urban roadway, 0 otherwise) – – – – – −4.471 
(−3.07)
–
SD of parameter density function – – – – – 2.319  
(2.82)
–
N 31 169 37 34 79 198 97
R2 0.857 0.841 0.948 0.838 0.930 0.755 0.760
Adjusted R2 0.820 0.834 0.939 0.809 0.922 0.743 0.744
A + B, cost-plus-time; DBOM, design–build–operate–maintain; I/D: incentives/disincentives, PBC, performance-based contracting.
Notation “–” denotes statistically insignificant parameters.
Table 2 | continued
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Table 3 | random parameters binary logit model estimation results for cost savings occurrence (t-stats in parentheses).
Variables a + b DbOM i/D lane rental Pbc Traditional Warranty
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
Constant 3.246 (3.11) – – – – 2.683 (4.41) –
SD of parameter density function – – – – 4.376 (5.52) –
State indicator (1 if Indiana, 0 otherwise) – 8.700 (1.78) – – – – –
State indicator (1 if Minnesota, 0 otherwise) – −6.570 (−2.61) – – – – –
State indicator (1 if Virginia, 0 otherwise) – – – – – – −4.410 (−3.37)
contract characteristics
Contract cost (in $1M) – – – – – −1.689 (−4.00) –
Contract cost indicator (1 if greater than $70 M, 0 otherwise) – – – – – – 4.012 (2.59)
Contract cost indicator (1 if greater than $110 M, 0 otherwise) – – – – −2.418 (−2.13) – –
Contract cost indicator (1 if greater than $4 M, 0 otherwise) – 4.390 (3.02) – – – – –
SD of parameter density function – 3.127 (2.72) – – – – –
Contract duration (in years) – – – 1.954 (2.42) – –
Contract duration indicator (1 if between 2 and 6 years, 0 otherwise) – – – – – −1.470 (−1.96)
Contract duration indicator (1 if less than 6 years, 0 otherwise) – – 2.079 (3.92) – – –
Contract duration indicator (1 if greater than 5 years, 0 otherwise) – −6.679 (−3.03) – – –
Contract duration indicator (1 if less than 3.5 years, 0 otherwise) – – – – – −0.999 (−2.08) –
Project size (in 100s of lane-miles) – 13.828 (2.25) – – 0.718 (4.15) – –
SD of parameter density function – 8.400 (1.75) – – – – –
Project size indicator (1 if less than 30 lane-miles, 0 otherwise) – – – – – – 1.401 (1.65)
SD of parameter density function – – – – – – 5.898 (3.76)
Number of assets indicator (1 if one asset included in the contract, 0 otherwise) – 4.982 (2.56) – – 2.335 (2.02) – –
SD of parameter density function – – – – 3.150 (2.30) – –
Number of assets indicator (1 if three assets are included in the contract, 0 
otherwise)
−2.754 (−1.92) – – – – –
asset type
Asset type indicator (1 if pavement repair/maintenance/treatment, 0 otherwise) −2.324 (−1.66) – – – – – –
Asset type indicator (1 if non-recorded assets are included in the contract, 0 
otherwise)
– 5.419 (1.78) – – – – –
Asset type indicator (1 if traffic signs and signals, 0 otherwise) – – – −4.294 (−1.77) – – –
Asset type indicator (1 if illumination repair/maintenance, 0 otherwise) – – – – – 2.675 (2.29) –
SD of parameter density function – – – – – 5.525 (2.84) –
Asset type indicator (1 if mowing, 0 otherwise) – – – – – −4.530 (−3.54) –
N 31 169 37 34 79 198 97
LL(β) −8.457 −36.759 −13.251 −3.222 −29.061 −97.146 −55.711
LL(0) −11.921 −69.053 −24.191 −23.044 −35.325 −136.879 −62.833
A + B, cost-plus-time; DBOM, design–build–operate–maintain; I/D, incentives/disincentives; PBC, performance-based contracting.
Notation “–” denotes statistically insignificant parameters.
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Table 4 | random parameters linear regression model estimation results for cost overrun percentage (t-stats in parentheses).
Variables a + b DbOM i/D lane rental Pbc Traditional Warranty
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
Constant – – −10.878  
(−4.33)
– – – 21.792  
(6.19)
contract characteristics
Contract cost (in $1M) – 0.151  
(4.69)
– – 0.027  
(1.95)
– –
SD of parameter density function – 0.103  
(3.95)
– – 0.046  
(5.17)
– –
Inverse of the contract cost (in $100K) – – −4.353  
(−8.99)
– – –
Contract duration (in years) – – – – – 2.966  
(3.28)
1.273  
(2.09)
SD of parameter density function – – – – – 3.271  
(13.21)
1.676  
(5.16)
Inverse of the contract duration – – 54.231  
(6.81)
– – – –
SD of parameter density function – – 45.573  
(15.89)
– – – –
Contract duration indicator (1 if greater than 4 years, 0 otherwise) – – – – −5.459  
(−5.51)
– –
SD of parameter density function – – – – 13.535  
(15.41)
– –
Contract duration indicator (1 if greater than 1.5 years, 0 otherwise) – – – 9.280  
(6.06)
– – –
SD of parameter density function – – – 8.263  
(8.39)
– – –
Project size (in lane-miles) −0.158  
(−2.61)
– – – – – –
SD of parameter density function 0.146  
(2.10)
– – – – – –
Natural logarithm of project size (in lane-miles) – – – – – – 1.702  
(1.77)
SD of parameter density function – – – – – – 3.258  
(6.40)
Project size indicator (1 if between 10 and 20 lane-miles, 0 otherwise) – 10.005  
(3.42)
– – – – –
Project size indicator (1 if greater than 100 lane-miles, 0 otherwise) – – – – −4.053  
(−1.27)
– –
Number of assets indicator (1 if three assets, 0 otherwise) 26.442  
(2.55)
– – – – – –
SD of parameter density function 22.671  
(2.55)
– – – – – –
Number of assets indicator (1 if one asset, 0 otherwise) – – – – – 7.824  
(1.67)
–
SD of parameter density function – – – – – 5.852  
(4.67)
–
(Continued )
10
N
ahidi et al.
D
iscrepancies in P
P
P
 R
oadw
ay P
rojects
Frontiers in B
uilt Environm
ent | w
w
w
.frontiersin.org
M
arch 2017 | Volum
e 3 | A
rticle 15
Variables a + b DbOM i/D lane rental Pbc Traditional Warranty
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
Number of assets indicator (1 if two or less assets, 0 otherwise) – −23.758  
(−5.44)
– – – – –
SD of parameter density function – 5.457  
(4.90)
– – – – –
asset type
Asset type indicator (1 if pavement repair/maintenance/treatment, 0 otherwise) 30.452  
(3.74)
13.365  
(4.39)
– – – – –
SD of parameter density function 31.269  
(3.51)
28.060  
(11.14)
– – – – –
Asset type indicator (1 if bridge- tunnel repair/maintenance/management, or culvert/ditches/gutters/drainage repair/
maintenance/replacement, 0 otherwise)
– −10.225  
(−3.50)
– – – – –
Asset type indicator (1 if bridge- tunnel repair/maintenance/management, 0 otherwise) – – −14.229  
(−4.29)
– – – –
Asset type indicator (1 if guardrail or illumination repair/maintenance, 0 otherwise) – – – 63.718  
(5.47)
– – –
Asset type indicator (1 if landscape, 0 otherwise) – – – −51.913  
(−4.24)
– – –
SD of parameter density function – – – 14.162  
(3.06)
– – –
Asset type indicator (1 if guardrail repair/maintenance, 0 otherwise) – – – – – 11.745  
(2.01)
–
Asset type indicator (1 if electrical/cable system repair/maintenance, 0 otherwise) – – – – – 35.270  
(8.76)
–
SD of parameter density function – – – – – 81.915  
(28.71)
–
Asset type indicator (1 if emergency facilities maintenance/response, or illumination repair/maintenance, or electrical/
cable system repair/rehabilitation/treatment, 0 otherwise)
– – – – 13.093  
(5.96)
– –
Asset type indicator (1 if crack/pothole sealing/repair, or emergency facilities maintenance/repair, 0 otherwise) – – – – – – 12.712  
(20.03)
SD of parameter density function – – – – – – 16.842  
(2.96)
Asset type indicator (1 if pavement repair/maintenance/treatment, 0 otherwise) – – – – – – −8.165  
(−2.09)
roadway characteristics
Highway indicator (1 if highway, 0 otherwise) – 31.117  
(7.38)
– – – – –
SD of parameter density function – 13.219  
(13.29)
– – – – –
N 31 169 37 34 79 198 97
R2 0.753 0.836 0.825 0.897 0.945 0.853 0.730
Adjusted R2 0.726 0.825 0.796 0.879 0.939 0.847 0.705
A + B, cost-plus-time; DBOM, design–build–operate–maintain; I/D, incentives/disincentives; PBC, performance-based contracting.
Notation “–” denotes statistically insignificant parameters.
Table 4 | continued
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Table 5 | random parameters binary probit model estimation results for cost overrun occurrence (t-stats in parentheses).
Variables a + b DbOM i/D lane rental Pbc Traditional
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
Constant – – 17.865 (−2.46) – – –
contract characteristics
Contract cost (in $1M) −0.088 (−1.95) – – – – –
Contract cost indicator (1 if greater than $11M, 0 otherwise) – – – – – −1.840 (−4.09)
Contract cost indicator (1 if less than $11M, 0 otherwise) – −1.334 (−3.06) – – – –
Inverse of the square root of the project size (in lane-miles) – – 0.811 (2.81) – – –
Project size indicator (1 if less than 50 lane-miles, 0 otherwise) – 0.460 (1.76) – – – –
Project size indicator (1 if less than 185 lane-miles, 0 otherwise) – – – – −6.024 (−2.07) –
SD of parameter density function – – – – 11.639 (2.59) –
Size/duration indicator (1 if contract duration is greater than 2.5 years and project size is less than 40 
lane-miles, 0 otherwise)
– – – 3.510 (−2.48) – –
Number of assets indicator (1 if one, 0 otherwise) – – – −2.955 (−2.04) – –
Number of assets indicator (1 if two, 0 otherwise) – – −8.035 (2.85) – – 0.945 (3.84)
Number of assets indicator (1 if two or more, 0 otherwise) – – – – −3.834 (−2.56) –
SD of parameter density function – – – – 2.460 (2.55) –
asset type
Asset type indicator (1 if rest areas, 0 otherwise) – −1.546 (−2.91) – – – –
Asset type indicator (1 if guardrail repair/maintenance, or pavement repair/maintenance/treatment, or 
rest areas, 0 otherwise)
1.443 (1.98) – – – – –
SD of parameter density function 1.156 (2.06) – – – – –
Asset type indicator (1 if general repair/maintenance/rehabilitation/treatment, 0 otherwise) – – – 2.073 (1.87) – –
Asset type indicator (1 if illumination repair/maintenance, or landscape repair/maintenance, or 
pavement repair/maintenance/treatment, or traffic signs and signals, or vegetation/tree control/
maintenance/removal, 0 otherwise)
– 1.188 (2.85) – – – –
SD of parameter density function – 4.377 (3.40) – – – –
Asset type indicator (1 if emergency facilities maintenance/response/management, or landscape repair/
maintenance, or electrical/cable system repair/maintenance, 0 otherwise)
– – – – 3.882 (2.42) –
Asset type indicator (1 if bridge-tunnel repair/maintenance/management, or general maintenance/
repair/rehabilitation/treatment, or guardrail repair/maintenance, 0 otherwise)
– – – – – 1.144 (3.77)
roadway characteristics
Road type indicator (1 if urban roadway, 0 otherwise) – 0.506 (2.20) – – – −1.530 (−2.21)
SD of parameter density function – – – – – 2.460 (2.55)
N 31 169 37 34 79 198
LL(β) −18.664 −91.810 −10.93 −11.286 −33.635 −91.809
LL(0) −21.342 −102.636 −24.98 −15.844 −52.915 −122.276
A + B, cost-plus-time; DBOM, design–build–operate–maintain; I/D, incentives/disincentives; PBC, performance-based contracting.
Notation “–” denotes statistically insignificant parameters. Also, due to the very small number of observations, the model for warranties was not estimated.
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decrease the DBOM and I/D cost overrun. In such large projects, 
contractors are likely overbidding, to account for minor change 
orders or other factors that can possibly lead to cost overrun. 
On the contrary, contractors may infrequently underestimate 
low-cost activities (e.g., electrical cable and system maintenance, 
guardrail repair and maintenance, landscape, and illuminations 
repair and maintenance, to name a few), and bid lower to get the 
award. To that end, the results show that such low-cost activities 
generally increase cost overrun.
As far as the likelihood of cost overrun occurrence is con-
cerned, the estimation results of the random parameters (mixed) 
binary probit models show that the final cost of the contract has 
mixed effects on the outcome probabilities. Traditional contracts 
with a final cost of $11M or greater are less likely to incur cost 
overrun; DBOM contracts with a final cost of less than $11M are 
less likely to incur cost overrun; and as the final cost of A + B 
contracts increases, the likelihood of cost overrun decreases. 
Examining the impact of project size (in terms of lane-miles), 
the results show that for DBOM, I/D, and lane rentals, shorter 
size projects are more likely to incur cost overrun. While, for 
70% of PBC contracts with less than 185 lane-miles, the likeli-
hood of cost overrun occurrence decreases, and increases for the 
remaining 30%.
Activity type also plays an important role in determining 
the likelihood of cost overrun occurrence, with pavement and 
guardrail repair and maintenance increasing the cost overrun 
likelihood in 90% of A +  B contracts, and decreasing it for 
the remaining 10%. In addition, bridge-tunnel activities, and 
general maintenance, repair, and rehabilitation, are found to 
generally increase the likelihood of cost overrun occurrence. 
DBOM contracts implemented in urban areas are less likely to 
incur cost overrun for their majority (73% of contracts), and 
more likely for a small minority (27%) of contracts—likely 
picking up region-specific heterogeneity. It should be noted 
that warranty contracts are found to be generally associated 
with a higher cost overrun likelihood, as compared to the other 
PPP types.
change Orders
Tables  6 and 7 presents the model estimation results of the 
random parameters Poisson and binary logit models, for the fre-
quency and likelihood of change orders, respectively. The results 
show that a variety of factors affect the frequency and likelihood 
of change orders occurrence. For example, A +  B contracts in 
Minnesota have a higher change orders frequency, which is pos-
sibly capturing the effect of unobserved factors, such as design 
errors or weather conditions. The duration of the contract also 
plays an important role in change orders occurrence. A +  B 
contracts with a duration of 5.8 years (derived as the mean A + B 
contract duration plus 1 SD) or less have a lower change orders 
frequency; traditional and DBOM contracts with a duration of 2 
or more and 5 or more years, respectively, have a higher change 
orders frequency; and I/D contracts with a duration of 2.5 years 
or greater have a lower change orders frequency for 82% of the 
contracts, and a higher for the remaining 18%. Project size (in 
lane-miles) has varying effects on change orders occurrence, due 
to the unique attributes of each PPP type. As the A + B project 
size increases, the change orders frequency decreases for 93% 
of the contracts, and increases for the remaining 7%; however, 
DBOM, I/D, PBC, and traditional large size projects are likely to 
incur higher change orders frequency. With respect to activity 
types, bridge-tunnel, guardrail, pavement, and general repair and 
maintenance are all found to increase change orders frequency for 
PPP contracts. However, assets related to repair, maintenance and 
treatment of the electrical cable system, illumination, landscape, 
traffic signs, and signals are found to decrease the change orders 
frequency.
The binary logit model estimation results show that large size 
(in terms of lane-miles) A + B, DBOM, and warranty projects 
are less likely to incur change orders, while, for the remaining 
of the PPP types, large size projects are more likely to incur 
change orders. In a similar fashion, the likelihood of change 
orders occurrence increases with the project’s cost (as the cost 
increases, the likelihood of change orders occurrence also 
increases). For most of the PPP types, longer contracts in terms 
of duration (in years) are more likely to incur change orders. 
Activities such as illumination maintenance and repair, litter 
removal, vegetation or tree control, maintenance and removal, 
traffic signs and signals, guardrail repair, and maintenance and 
rest areas, are all found to generally decrease the likelihood of 
change orders occurrence for I/D, lane rentals, traditional, and 
warranty contracts. On the other hand, activities such as bridge-
tunnel repair, maintenance and management, pavement repair, 
maintenance and treatment, culvert, ditches gutter and drainage 
system repair, maintenance, let under A + B and PBC, are more 
likely to incur change orders.
Time Delay
Tables 8 and 9 presents the model estimation results of the ran-
dom parameters Weibul hazard-based duration and binary logit 
models, for the duration and likelihood of time delay, respectively. 
Project size (measured in lane-miles) is found to have various 
effects on the duration of time delay. For warranties, PBC, and 
DBOM contracts, an increase in the size of the project increases 
time delay; however, under some PPP types, such as A + B, I/D, 
and traditional contracts, large size projects reduce time delay. 
Furthermore, time delay is intuitively affected by the contract 
duration, with a contract duration increase resulting in successive 
increases in time delay. This result is likely capturing the effect 
of larger projects, which can frequently be more comprehensive, 
and for which a minor change in the project’s original scope is 
likely to result in time delay. With respect to the effect of contract 
final cost, contracts with higher final costs are intuitively found to 
have greater time delay (Bordat et al., 2004; Anastasopoulos et al., 
2012). The number of activities and activity types are also crucial 
in determining the duration of time delay. With the exception 
of warranties, contracts with three or more activities increase 
the duration of time delay for all other PPP types. At the same 
time, activities such as bridge-tunnel, culvert, ditches, gutters 
and drainage system repair, and maintenance decrease the dura-
tion of time delay. These findings are in line with past research 
(Anastasopoulos et al., 2010a).
The random parameters (mixed) binary logit model estima-
tion results of time delay occurrence show that, for the majority of 
Table 6 | random parameters Poisson model estimation results for change orders frequency (t-stats in parentheses).
Variables a + b DbOM i/D lane rental Pbc Traditional Warranty
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
Constant – – 0.916 (3.67) 0.861 (2.58) 1.565 (12.46) 0.994 (9.38) 1.449 (15.38)
State indicator (1 if Minnesota, 0 otherwise) 1.642 (4.43) – – – – – –
contract characteristics – – – – – – –
Contract cost indicator (1 if greater than $100M, 0 otherwise) – – – – – 0.495 (2.10) –
Contract duration indicator (1 if 5.8 years or less, 0 otherwise) −0.813 (−1.85) – – – – –
Contract duration indicator (1 if greater than 2 years, 0 otherwise) – – – – – 0.424 (4.81) –
Contract duration indicator (1 if greater than 5 years, 0 otherwise) – 0.445 (4.10) – – – – –
Contract duration indicator (1 if greater than 2.5 years, 0 otherwise) – – −0.524 (−1.86) – – – –
SD of parameter density function – – 0.566 (4.12) – – – –
Project size (in lane-miles) −0.178 (−3.27) – – – – – –
SD of parameter density function 0.121 (4.10) – – – – – –
Project size indicator (1 if greater than 36 lane-miles, 0 otherwise) – 0.295 (2.62) – – – – –
Project size indicator (1 if greater than 130 lane-miles, 0 otherwise) – – 0.847 (2.71) – – – –
Project size indicator (1 if less than 100 lane-miles, 0 otherwise) – – – – −0.743 (−3.65) – –
Project size indicator (1 if less than 80 lane-miles, 0 otherwise) – – – – – −0.234 (−3.06) –
Number of assets indicator (1 if between one and five assets, 0 otherwise) – – – 0.752 (2.25) – – –
asset type
Asset type indicator (1 if bridge-tunnel repair/maintenance/management, or 
illumination repair/maintenance, 0 otherwise)
– 0.457 (3.94) – – – – –
Asset type indicator (1 if bridge-tunnel repair/maintenance, 0 otherwise) – – – – – 0.668 (7.93) 0.512 (5.07)
Asset type indicator (1 if guardrail repair/maintenance, 0 otherwise) – 0.643 (4.38) – – −1.112 (−3.54) – –
SD of parameter density function – – – – 0.669 (2.44) – –
Asset type indicator (1 if pavement repair/maintenance/treatment, 0 otherwise) – 1.292 (9.72) – – 0.730 (3.26) 0.586 (5.71) 0.436 (4.30)
Asset type indicator (1 if all assets are included in the contract, 0 otherwise) – 0.902 (4.26) – – 0.545 (2.64) – –
Asset type indicator (1 if general maintenance/repair/rehabilitation/treatment, 0 
otherwise)
– 0.503 (4.75) – – – 0.389 (4.23) 0.242 (2.54)
SD of parameter density function – 0.446 (5.50) – – – – –
Asset type indicator (1 if electrical/cable system repair/maintenance, 0 otherwise) – – – −0.585 (−2.93) – – −0.296 (−2.39)
Asset type indicator (1 if traffic signs and signals, 0 otherwise) – – – – −1.977 (−3.55) −0.309 (−2.53) −0.569 (−1.84)
SD of parameter density function – – – – 1.650 (3.33) – –
Asset type indicator (1 if illumination repair/maintenance, 0 otherwise) – – – – −1.862 (−2.23) −0.616 (−2.46) –
SD of parameter density function – – – – 2.538 (3.06) – –
Asset type indicator (1 if landscape repair/maintenance, 0 otherwise) – – – – – −0.712 (−2.11) –
Asset type indicator (1 if shoulder repair/maintenance, 0 otherwise) – – – – – 0.289 (2.65) –
Asset type indicator (1 if guardrail repair/maintenance, or illumination repair/
maintenance, or landscape repair/maintenance, 0 otherwise)
– – – – – – −0.613 (−3.79)
N 31 169 37 34 79 198 97
LL(β) −26.474 −317.596 −60.216 −64.432 −151.850 −340.764 −185.505
LL(0) −50.755 −372.015 −74.396 −73.984 −234.420 −455.756 −233.418
A + B, cost-plus-time; DBOM, design–build–operate–maintain; I/D, incentives/disincentives; PBC, performance-based contracting.
Notation “–” denotes statistically insignificant parameters.
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Table 7 | binary logit model estimation results for change orders occurrence (t-stats in parentheses).
Variables a + b DbOM i/D lane rental Pbc Traditional Warranty
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
Constant – – – – – 11.545 (4.38) –
contract information
Contract cost (in $100M) – – – 18.396 (1.79) 8.856 (3.09) – –
Inverse of the contract cost (in $100K) – – – – – −2.398 (−2.91) –
Contract cost indicator (1 if greater than $12M, 0 otherwise) 2.934 (1.92) – – – – – –
Contract cost indicator (1 if less than $25M, 0 otherwise) – −5.773 (−1.75) – – – – –
Contract duration (in years) – 3.059 (2.57) – 0.639 (1.75) – – –
Contract duration indicator (1 if greater than 3.5 years, 0 otherwise) – – – – – – 1.295 (2.37)
Contract duration indicator (1 if greater than 3.8 years, 0 otherwise) – – −2.787 (−1.84) – – – –
Contract duration indicator (1 if less than 4 years, 0 otherwise) – – – – −2.348 (−2.37) – –
Project size (in lane-miles) −0.175 (−2.48) −0.055 (−2.09) 0.052 (2.40) – – – –
Project size indicator (1 if greater than 120 lane-miles, 0 otherwise) – – – – 1.781 (2.20) – –
Project size indicator (1 if less than 30 lane-miles, 0 otherwise) – – – – – – 1.002 (2.24)
Number of assets indicator (1 two assets, 0 otherwise) – – 4.295 (2.45) – – – –
Number of assets indicator (1 if three or more assets, 0 otherwise) – – – – – −7.162 (−3.32) –
assets type
Asset type indicator (1 if non-recorded assets are included in the contract, 
0 otherwise)
– −6.354 (−2.04) – – – – 0.906 (1.68)
Asset type indicator (1 if traffic signs and signals, 0 otherwise) – – – – – −4.472 (−3.15) –
Asset type indicator (1 if bridge-tunnel repair/maintenance/management, 
or general repair/maintenance/rehabilitation/treatment, or pavement repair/
maintenance/treatment, or vegetation/tree control/maintenance/removal, 
0 otherwise)
1.670 (2.40) – – – – – –
Asset type indicator (1 if management, or guardrail repair/maintenance, 
or illumination repair/maintenance, or landscape repair/maintenance, 
0 otherwise)
– – −5.536 (−3.85) – – – –
Asset type indicator (1 if rest area, 0 otherwise) – – – −3.229 (−2.43) – – –
Asset type indicator (1 if culvert/ditches/gutters/drainage repair/
maintenance/replacement, or general maintenance/repair/rehabilitation/
treatment, 0 otherwise)
– – – – 7.368 (1.87) – –
Asset type indicator (1 if guardrail maintenance/repair, 0 otherwise) – – – – – −6.876 (−3.16) –
N 31 169 37 34 79 198 97
LL(β) −6.180 −6.371 −11.563 −4.448 −18.965 −10.836 −14.858
LL(0) −17.702 −22.538 −22.517 −12.315 −38.397 −39.599 −22.508
A + B, cost-plus-time; DBOM, design–build–operate–maintain; I/D, incentives/disincentives; PBC, performance-based contracting.
Notation “–” denotes statistically insignificant parameters.
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Table 8 | random parameters duration (Weibull) model estimation results for time delay (t-stats in parentheses).
Variables a + b and i/D DbOM lane rental Pbc Traditional Warranty
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
Constant – 0.926 (55.60) −1.230 (−8.41) – – –
State indicator (1 if Minnesota, 0 otherwise) – −0.539 (−10.79) – – – –
SD of parameter density function – 0.107 (2.75) – – – –
contract characteristics – –
Contract cost (in $100M) – 0.107 (2.92) 1.543 (2.91) – – 0.461 (9.50)
Contract cost indicator (1 if greater than $28M, 0 otherwise) 1.072 (1.78) – – – – –
Contract duration indicator (1 if greater than 2 years, 0 otherwise) – – 0.833 (5.41) – – –
SD of parameter density function – – 0.212 (5.34) – – –
Contract duration indicator (1 if greater than 4 years, 0 otherwise) – – – – 1.234 (18.67) –
Contract duration indicator (1 if greater than 5 years, 0 otherwise) – – – – – 1.744 (17.61)
Contract duration indicator (1 if greater than 5.5 years, 0 otherwise) – 0.260 (16.99) – – – –
SD of parameter density function – 0.079 (9.66) – – – –
Natural logarithm of project size (in lane-miles) – – – 0.102 (5.97) – –
Project size indicator (1 if greater than 180 lane-miles, 0 otherwise) – – – – −0.178 (−2.39) –
Project size indicator (1 if greater than 45 lane-miles, 0 otherwise) −2.076 (−3.26) – – – – –
Project size indicator (1 if less than 12 lane-miles, 0 otherwise) – −0.039 (−2.25) – – – –
Project size indicator (1 if less than 30 lane-miles, 0 otherwise) – – – – – −0.977 (−17.30)
SD of parameter density function – – – – – 0.186 (7.43)
Number of assets indicator (1 if two or more assets, 0 otherwise) 0.308 (1.89) – – – – –
Number of assets indicator (1 if one asset, 0 otherwise) – – – – −0.110 (−2.19) –
Number of assets indicator (1 if less than three assets, 0 otherwise) – – – – – 0.371 (4.20)
assets types
Asset type indicator (1 if bridge-tunnel repair/maintenance/management, or traffic signs and 
signals, 0 otherwise)
– −0.076 (−3.55) – – – –
Asset type indicator (1 if bridge-tunnel repair/maintenance/management, 0 otherwise) – – – – −0.878 (−11.92) –
SD of parameter density function – – – – 1.321 (17.30) –
Asset type indicator (1 if culvert/ditches/gutters/drainage repair/maintenance/replacement, 0 
otherwise)
– – – – −1.246 (−16.18) –
SD of parameter density function – – – – 0.739 (9.34) –
Asset type indicator (1 if pavement maintenance/repair/treatment, 0 otherwise) – – – – −0.306 (−2.98) –
Asset type indicator (1 if rest areas, 0 otherwise) – – – – −0.120 (−1.82) –
Asset type indicator (1 if bridge-tunnel repair/maintenance/management, or culvert/ditches/
gutter/drainage repair/maintenance/replacement, or landscape repair/maintenance, or 
pavement repair/maintenance/treatment, 0 otherwise)
– – – −0.760 (−6.53) – –
SD of parameter density function – – – 0.837 (6.57) – –
Asset type indicator (1 if illumination repair/maintenance, 0 otherwise) – – – – – 0.458 (4.75)
Asset type indicator (1 if electrical/cable system repair/maintenance, 0 otherwise) – – – – – −0.444 (−7.91)
SD of parameter density function – – – – – 0.638 (10.52)
N 18 169 34 21 180 95
LL(β) −17.405 −15.875 −14.959 −21.199 −151.763 −49.343
LL(0) −23.815 −118.568 −25.885 −25.885 −294.220 −133.368
A + B, cost-plus-time; DBOM, design–build–operate–maintain; I/D, incentives/disincentives; PBC, performance-based contracting.
Notation “–” denotes statistically insignificant parameters. Also, likelihood ratio tests showed that A + B and I/D models should be combined.
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Table 9 | random parameters binary logit model estimation results for time delay occurrence (t-stats in parentheses).
Variables a + b i/D Pbc Traditional
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
Constant −3.747 (−2.84) −32.878 (−1.85) – –
SD of parameter density function – 3.215 (1.80) – –
State indicator (1 if Alaska, 0 otherwise) – – 4.242 (2.82) –
State indicator (1 if Texas, 0 otherwise) – – – −1.255 (−2.33)
contract characteristics
Contract cost (in $100M) 7.896 (1.99) – – –
Contract cost indicator (1 if less than $70M, 0 otherwise) – – – 2.185 (5.62)
Contract duration (in years) 0.452 (1.83) 5.805 (1.85) – –
Contract duration indicator (1 if greater than 5.5 years, 0 otherwise) – – −3.989 (−2.95) –
Contract duration indicator (1 if less than 2 years, 0 otherwise) – – – −1.383 (−2.78)
SD of parameter density function – – – 0.987 (3.56)
Project size (in lane-miles) – – – 0.010 (2.83)
SD of parameter density function – – – 0.005 (2.05)
Project size indicator (1 if greater than 30 lane-miles, 0 otherwise) – – −3.753 (−3.01) –
SD of parameter density function – – 3.961 (3.11) –
Number of assets indicator (1 if one asset, 0 otherwise) – – 3.530 (2.71) –
Number of assets indicator (1 if three or more, 0 otherwise) 1.229 (1.73) – – –
asset type
Asset type indicator (1 if culvert/ditches/gutters/drainage repair/maintenance/replacement, 0 
otherwise)
– – 6.127 (2.76) 17.405 (1.80)
N 31 37 79 198
LL(β) −10.868 −9.952 −33.276 −40.521
LL(0) −18.676 −20.527 −45.746 −60.318
A + B, cost-plus-time; DBOM, design–build–operate–maintain; I/D, incentives/disincentives; PBC, performance-based contracting.
Notation “–” denotes statistically insignificant parameters. Also, due to the very small number of observations, models for DBOM, lane rentals, and warranties were not estimated.
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the PPP types, comprehensive contracts with long duration, large 
size (in lane-mile terms), and high cost are more likely to incur 
time delay. In addition, A + B contracts with two or more assets 
are more likely to incur time delay; while, PBC contracts with 
two or more assets are less likely to incur time delay. With respect 
to the contract location, traditional contracts in Texas are less 
likely to incur time delay; in contrast, PBC contracts in Alaska 
are more likely to incur time delay. This result may be capturing 
weather or region-specific heterogeneity. Activity type is another 
important determinant of the likelihood of time delay occur-
rence, with contracts that include culvert, ditches, gutters and 
drainage repair, maintenance and replacement activities, being 
more likely to incur time delay. As a final point, all warranty, lane 
rental, and DBOM contracts are found to have higher likelihood 
of time delay occurrence.
sUMMarY anD cOnclUsiOn
This paper seeks to provide an empirical analysis of the influence 
of contract, project, and roadway characteristics on common 
project discrepancy types (cost savings, cost overrun, change 
orders, and time delay), for popular roadway construction 
and preservation PPP contract types [traditional outsourcing, 
cost-plus-time (A +  B), DBOM, I/D, lane rentals, PBC, and 
warranties]. The presented comprehensive statistical modeling 
framework allows the identification of factors that affect both the 
extent (typically used by transportation agencies in the planning 
phase) and the likelihood (frequently used by transportation 
agencies in the pre-planning phase) of project discrepancies, 
while accounting for unobserved factors that can vary system-
atically across the observations (i.e., unobserved heterogeneity). 
The factors that affect the extent of project discrepancies for each 
PPP type, are statistically modeled with random parameters 
linear regression models (for the cost savings and cost overrun 
percentages), with random parameters count data (Poisson) 
models (for the change orders frequency), and with random 
parameters hazard-based duration (Weibull) models (for the 
time delay duration). While random parameters (mixed) binary 
logit and probit models are estimated to investigate the factors 
affecting the likelihood of cost savings, cost overrun, change 
orders, and time delay occurrence.
Table 10 provides a qualitative overview of the various factors 
affecting the extent and the likelihood of project discrepancies, 
by PPP type. Although the analysis does not aim to yield explicit 
guidelines regarding the adoption of the most appropriate PPP 
type, it has the potential to provide significant insights with regard 
to the effectiveness of each PPP type, in the context of different 
project discrepancies and several contract- and project-specific 
characteristics. The model estimation results show that contracts 
with longer duration generally incur lower cost savings and have 
lower cost savings occurrence likelihood. Longer contract dura-
tion also results in cost overrun, time delay, and change orders 
increase. For most of the PPP types (A + B, DBOM, PBC, and 
I/D), large size projects incur a reduction in cost savings, and an 
increase in cost overrun and time delay; while, for DBOM, PBCs, 
and traditional contracts, large size projects incur an increase in 
change orders frequency. Furthermore, in cases of high contract 
cost, DBOM, I/D, and warranties are found to increase cost 
Table 10 | summary of the variable effect on the project discrepancies by public–private partnership type (brackets reveal mixed effects).
Variables a + b DbOM i/D lane rental Pbc Warranty
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contract characteristics
Project size (in lane-miles) [↓] [↓] [↓] ↓ [↓] [↑] ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ [↓] ↓ ↑ [↑] [↓] [↑] ↑ [↓]
Contract duration (years) ↑ ↓ ↑ [↑] ↓ ↑ [↓] ↑ [↑] ↑ [↑] [↓] ↓ ↓ [↓] [↑] ↑
Contract cost (in $1M) ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ [↑] ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ [↑] ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
Number of assets [↓] [↑] ↑ [↓] ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ [↑] [↓] [↓] ↑
asset type
Pavement repair/maintenance/
treatment
↓ [↑] ↑ ↑ [↑] ↑ ↓ ↑ [↓] ↓ ↑
Traffic signs and signals ↓ [↓] ↓
Bridge-tunnel repair/maintenance ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ [↓] ↑
Guardrail repair/maintenance [↑] ↑ ↓ [↓] ↑ ↑ [↓] ↓
General maintenance/repair 
rehabilitation/treatment
↑ [↑] ↓ ↑ ↑
Electrical/cable system repair/
maintenance
↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ [↓]
Illumination repair/maintenance ↑ ↑ [↓] [↓] ↓ ↑
Landscape repair/maintenance [↓] ↑ [↓] ↓ ↓
Mowing or vegetation/tree 
control/maintenance/removal
[↑] [↑]
Rest areas ↓
Crack/pothole sealing/repair [↑]
roadway characteristics
Highway indicator (1 if highway, 0 
otherwise)
[↑]
Urban roadway indicator (1 if 
urban roadway, 0 otherwise)
↑
A + B, cost-plus-time; DBOM, design–build–operate–maintain; I/D, incentives/disincentives; PBC, performance-based contracting.
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savings; the opposite holds for lane rentals, PBCs, and tradi-
tional contracts. The number and type of assets (constructed 
or preserved) included in a contract also play an important role 
in project discrepancies by PPP type. A general finding is that 
contracts with many assets incur lower cost savings, and higher 
cost overrun and time delay. On the other hand, the activity types 
have varying effects on project discrepancies for each PPP type. 
For example, activities such as guardrail, shoulder repair and 
maintenance, traffic signs and signals, and electrical and cable 
repair and maintenance, perform better (in terms of cost savings, 
cost overrun, change orders, and time delay) when they are let 
under lane rentals. In contrast, crack and pothole sealing, and 
pavement repair and maintenance, perform better (in terms of 
cost related discrepancies) when they are let under warranties. 
In addition, contracts with generally low-cost activities (such 
as mowing, vegetation, tree control, or landscape repair and 
maintenance) perform better when they are let either under lane 
rentals or warranties. Whereas, contracts with many and variable 
activities such as general management, or bridge repair and main-
tenance, perform better (in terms of most project discrepancies) 
when they are let under PBC.
In an overall assessment, large-scale roadway projects (in terms 
of size, duration, cost and number of assets included) may favor 
the adoption of PBC or I/D; on the contrary, roadways projects 
associated with tighter deadlines or with activities requiring high 
level of expertise may be better accomplished under the DBOM 
or the warranty contractual approaches. The latter PPP types 
involve significant risk transfer to the contractors, which might 
act as incentive toward the minimization of cost- or time-related 
discrepancies. However, these general findings should be care-
fully assessed by Public Agencies and contractors in conjunction 
with various location-, time-, and detailed project-specific fac-
tors, which introduce considerable heterogeneity in the decision 
making process.
Unlike previous studies that have investigated project dis-
crepancies separately and—to a large extent—irrespective of the 
PPP type, this study provides a comprehensive framework that 
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informatively supported by the attributes of the factors that are 
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In all, this empirical study should be viewed as an incre-
mental step toward the development of decision-making 
guidelines for the adoption of various PPP types, as a function 
of project discrepancies and several contract, project, and 
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